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1 
Summary 
There are mainly three different international legal obligations regarding 
child soldiers in internal armed conflicts. The prohibition from child 
recruitment, to provide special protection for children and protection from 
taking part in hostilities. All are applicable to States but it is less clear which 
of them apply to non-state actors. In order to determine if these obligations 
are applicable to non-state actors, different theories of where those 
obligations could have originated from. There are mainly five possibilities 
of origin. The possibility of binding a third party to a treaty, legislative 
jurisdiction, governmental claims, acceptance and customary international 
law.  
 
If one of those theories applies to the situation at hand, the next step is to 
analyse if the non-state actor meets the requirements for them to be bound 
by international law. These requirements are different conditions or 
characteristics in the form of thresholds the non-state actors have to pass. 
There are the threshold of organisation, stability and effective control and 
international legal personality. It is also important to remember the 
difference in international law between the branches of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law since the latter is more state-centric 
and therefore more difficult to apply it to non-state actors.  
 
If there is an applicable theory, the non-state actor meets the requirements 
and the obligation originates from either international humanitarian law or 
customary international law, the non-state actor should in theory be bound 
by it. 
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Sammanfattning 
Det finns framförallt tre olika internationella skyldigheter angående 
barnsoldater i interna väpnade konflikter. Förbud från att rekrytera barn till 
väpnade styrkor, förse barn med särskilt skydd samt att skydde barn från att 
delta i fientligheter. Alla tre är tillämpliga på stater men det är oklart 
huruvida icke-statliga aktörer är bundna av de här skyldigheterna och i så 
fall vilka. Teorier om var förpliktelserna härrör från måste analyseras för att 
kunna avgöra ifall icke-statliga aktörer är bundna av internationella 
förpliktelser. Det finns bland annat fem olika teorier. Möjligheten till att 
binda en tredje part till en traktat, legislativ jurisdiktion, statliga anspråk, 
godkännande och sedvanlig international rätt.  
 
Om någon av dessa teorier är applicerbara på den givna situationen, nästa 
steg är att analysera ifall den icke-statliga aktören uppfyller kraven för att de 
ska kunna vara bundna av internationell rätt. Dessa olika krav är olika 
villkor eller egenskaper i form av tröskelvärden som de icke-statliga 
aktörerna måste passera. Tröskelvärdena är organisationsgränsen, stabilitet 
och effektivitet och internationell juridisk personlighet. Det är även viktigt 
att observera olikheterna mellan internationell humanitär rätt och mänskliga 
rättigheter eftersom mänskliga rättigheter är mer stats inriktad och därför 
svårare att applicera på icke-statliga aktörer.  
 
Den icke-statliga aktören är i teorin bunden av internationell rätt om det 
finns någon applicerbar teori, den icke-statliga aktören når upp till kraven 
och förpliktelsen härrör från antingen internationell humanitär rätt eller 
sedvanlig internationell rätt. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
As most situations and concepts develop over time, law also develops. In 
regard to public international law, humanitarian law and other laws 
regulating situations in armed conflict and war, a lot of changes have 
happened just in a matter of a few decades. Especially considering how war 
is constructed and waged. While the war setting has changed with new 
weapons, different stakes and otherwise developed, this development affects 
the civilians in different ways. Nowadays, it is common for other parties to 
get involved in wars except for States. These other parties can for example 
be armed groups or organisations that are considered as non-state actors. 
This has had implications on the laws but also on the society as a whole and 
it can cause civilians to be more exposed to the conflict since warfare often 
takes place in urban environment.1 This development has brought on 
changes to international laws and made the humanitarian laws even more 
current. Since the development has been fast, there is still a need to clarify 
the international obligations of these new non-state actors in order for them 
not being able to escape their legal obligations.2 This thesis will focus on the 
                                                
 
 
1 Turns, David. The Law of Armed Conflict. In Evans, Malcolm (Ed.), International Law 
(4th edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 832; Odello, Marco & Beruto, Jean 
Luca (Eds.). Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law: Organized armed 
groups: a challenge for the 21st century, Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2010, p. 67. 
2 Geneva Academy: “Armed Non-State Actors and the Human Rights Council”. Available 
at: <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/our-projects/our-projects/armed-conflict/detail/4>, 
accessed 29 November 2017. 
  
 
6 
protection of children in armed conflict involving non-state actors and 
particularly the children’s right to protection of military exploitation.    
 
Despite the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its mission to protect 
children, they still become victims of wars in different ways. Even today, 
more children are killed during wars than ten years ago. Between 1990 and 
2000, it is estimated that two million children were killed. The wars in 
Sudan, Liberia, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and lately Syria are terrible proof of 
that as can be seen in several case studies made by UNICEF.3  
 
By determining the applicable law to non-state actors the hope is to clarify 
the different obligations and thereby, hopefully, bring forward a change in 
international law which means that not only States will be accountable for 
recruiting child soldiers but that non-state actors also have the obligation to 
refrain from exposing children to armed conflicts since this has been 
disputable in the international legal community. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the current legal position of the 
obligations of non-state actors in non-international armed conflict in relation 
to child soldiers around the world. The thesis will examine the laws, the 
obligations they impose and how non-state actors are bound by these 
obligations. 
 
                                                
 
 
3 Ishay, R. Micheline. The history of human rights: from ancient times to the globalization 
era: with a new preface, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, p. 303. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
Which international legal obligations regarding the recruitment of child 
soldiers are there? 
How can international legal obligations derived from international law 
created by States bind non-state actors? 
Can NSAs be bound by international laws regarding child soldiers? 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
Since the scope of this thesis is limited, the subject had to be narrowed. This 
has been done by only focusing on non-state actors as subject and also 
focusing on non-international armed conflict as a specific situation. The 
subject has been further narrowed by only discussing the prohibition of 
child soldiers in international law. Further delimitations such as time or 
geographic has not been made since the essay is trying to map the legal 
obligations of non-state actors around the world and not only in a specific 
region or conflict. Only legal instruments that are relevant and in force 
today are used in the thesis. 
 
1.5 Method 
The method used in this essay is legal dogmatic method. By analysing the 
relevant instruments in international law and the legal implications of them 
in regard to child soldiers, this essay will search for connections between 
child soldiers and non-state actors in order to clarify the current legal 
situation of the subject. It is also analysing the question of how NSAs are 
bound by international law by presenting and discussing different theories 
made by legal scholars. 
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1.6 Previous Research 
Even though there is some research of non-state actors and child soldiers 
separately, research on the two subjects constructed in the way as it is in this 
essay, has not been found. Therefore the subject in this thesis is even more 
important when clarifying the international law since previous research on 
the responsibilities of non-state actors concerning child soldiers has been 
limited. This proves further the importance of a clarification in this field of 
international law. 
 
1.7 Material 
The material used in this essay is both primary and secondary sources. 
When stating the international law and the relevant instruments, primary 
sources have been used and secondary sources have been used when 
interpreting them. When interpreting primary sources, commentaries to the 
legal instruments have been used that have been published by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. Because of the origin of these 
commentaries and the fact that other writers and doctrine refer to them make 
them seem as reliable sources. 
Besides secondary sources, doctrine has been used and various articles from 
different scholars who have contributed to the debate. Whether or not these 
articles are reliable is of course important but they are not used as a 
foundation for facts or to support an argument. Since the field is somewhat 
unexplored, the secondary sources are primarily used as they are, namely 
theories and not as stated facts. As long as the theories these scholars 
present seem logical, they have a function in the second part of this thesis. 
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1.8 Disposition 
This thesis is divided into three main chapters. The three chapters are based 
on the research questions. The first chapter presents an overview of current 
international legal instruments and their provisions regarding child soldiers. 
Chapter two presents the issue of where non-state actors’ obligations 
originate from and whether non-state actors might be bound by international 
obligations. The third chapter discuss conditions and characteristics that 
non-state actors have to possess in order for the international instruments 
mentioned in chapter one to be applicable. After the three main chapters 
follows an overall analysis of which obligations non-state actors might be 
bound by and a conclusion on what has been presented in the thesis. 
 
1.9 Definitions 
1.9.1 Non-State Actors 
There are few definitions mentioned of Non-State Actors (NSAs) in 
international law.4 In the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolution 15405 on weapons of mass destruction and non-state actors offers 
a definition of non-state actors for the purpose of the resolution, the term 
was defined as a footnote for the purpose of the resolution without 
                                                
 
 
4 Bellal, Annyssa. Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration 
of the Practice of the UN Human Rights Council, Academy In-Brief No. 7, p. 7. Available 
at: <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/InBrief7_web.pdf>, 
accessed 10 November 2017. 
5 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) [concerning weapons of 
massive destruction], 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004). 
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addressing the non-state actors specifically.6 The definition in the resolution 
was that a non-state actor was an ‘individual or entity, not acting under the 
lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the 
scope of this resolution’.7  
 
However, there is no definition of NSAs, which is broadly accepted, in the 
international community, since it seems as though each definition is 
criticised by either the United States or some other State. But there are some 
classifications or examples of armed NSAs that seems to be more generally 
accepted than others. Some examples of armed NSAs are: Armed opposition 
groups, Paramilitary groups, Terrorist groups, Vigilante or Self-Defend 
groups and Territorial Gangs.8 In this thesis, groups such as armed 
opposition groups, paramilitary groups and terrorist groups will all be 
mentioned and included as a type of non-state actor. Therefore, the broad 
definition presented by the UNSC will be used.  
 
1.9.2 Non-International Armed Conflict 
Even though some of the first international humanitarian law instruments, 
such as the 1864 Geneva Convention, the 1868 Saint-Petersburg Declaration 
and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, date back to the nineteenth 
century, they were only applicable to international armed conflicts. Non-
International, also called internal, armed conflict was not mentioned in any 
international law instruments until the Geneva Conventions and the 
                                                
 
 
6 Clapham, Andrew. Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88 No. 863 (2006), p. 500. 
7 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). 
8 Bellal, Annyssa, p. 8.  
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Common Article 3 were concluded.9 Today non-international armed 
conflicts (NIACs) have gained international recognition and the term is 
frequently mentioned in international humanitarian law.10 
 
1.9.2.1 The Definition of Non-International Armed 
Conflict in International Law 
 
The definition of NIAC is present in for example the Geneva Conventions 
and the Hague Convention. In the Geneva Conventions, the definition is 
presented in the Common Article 3 and the wording is similar to the one 
found in Article 19.1 in the Hague Convention: 
 
Common Article 3 to the GCs: 
‘…armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties…’ 
 
Article 19.1 of the Hague Convention: 
‘… armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties…’ 
 
Article 8(f) in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
has a more elaborate definition even though it also refers to NIACs as 
an armed conflict not of an international character similar to the 
definitions in the GCs and the Hague Convention: 
 
                                                
 
 
9 David, Eric. Internal (Non-International) Armed Conflict. In Clapham, Andrew & Gaeta, 
Paola (Eds.), Haeck, Tom & Priddy, Alice (Ass. Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 353. 
10 David, Eric, p. 354. 
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 ‘Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character 
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State 
when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups.’ 
 
As can be seen, NIAC is defined in negative terms since it is described as an 
armed conflict not of international character in the territory of one of the 
Parties and this is how the term will be used in this thesis. The problem of 
non-state actors not being able to become party to a treaty is discussed in 
chapter 3.1 below. Therefore the definition used in this thesis is best 
explained by the broad and elaborate definition in Article 8(f) of the ICC 
Statute. 
 
1.9.2.2 Armed Conflict 
In the definition of a NIAC, there is an underlying preposition that the 
meaning of the word is based on the definition of an international armed 
conflict. Since a NIAC is defined in negative terms as an armed conflict not 
of international character, the definition of an international armed conflict 
has to be presented. 
 
When determining if the intensities of the conflict reach the required amount 
in order to be an international armed conflict, the Tadić case is important to 
mention. In the Tadić case from 1997, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia stated that the conflict had to reach a certain 
level of gravity and duration in order to classify as an armed conflict. How 
to determine if the conflict classifies as an armed conflict the intensity and 
the organisation of the parties has to be determined. This can be summarised 
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as two crucial elements; the nature of the conflict and the nature of the 
parties.11 These two criteria have to be fulfilled in order for the conflict to 
fall into the scope of IHL and be classified as an international armed 
conflict.12 The Tadić case is used in this thesis when establishing if the 
conflict reaches the criteria required in order to be classified as an armed 
conflict. 
 
1.9.3 Child Soldiers 
Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC, calls on all 
States to take action and protect children during war. This entails protection 
from being recruited and also participating in an armed conflict. Even 
though the convention defines a child as a person under the age of eighteen, 
the overall recognized age today is fifteen in regard to both voluntary and 
compulsory recruitment.13  
 
The definition of child soldiers is part of many soft law documents. The 
Paris Principles is one among them.14 Article 2.2 of the Paris Principles: 
‘“A child associated with an armed force or armed group” refers to any 
person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to 
children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or 
                                                
 
 
11 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, § 562, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html>, accessed 7 November 2017. 
12 David, Eric, p. 362. 
13 Ishay, R. Micheline, p. 301. 
14 Waschefort, Gus. "Situating the Debate." International Law and Child Soldiers, London: 
Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 13. 
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for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has 
taken a direct part in hostilities.’15 
 
The  Paris Principles is a result of two international conferences, the first 
was held in Cape Town in 1997 and the second in Paris in 2007. The 
conferences were hosted by UNICEF and included participants from 58 
States but also others such as different stakeholders. These conferences led 
to several new non-binding documents.16 
 
The term child soldiers in this thesis will thus be used as an abbreviation of 
“a child associated with an armed force or armed group”. Whether or not the 
age limit is defined as fifteen or eighteen is somewhat beyond the scope of 
this thesis and irrelevant to its discussion on the obligations of the NSAs. 
                                                
 
 
15 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on 
Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/465198442.html>, accessed 29 November 2017. 
16 Drumbl. A. Mark, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 3. 
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2 Substantive Obligations 
Regarding Child Soldiers in 
International Law 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to determine the obligations of non-state 
actors, it is of paramount importance to first present the law in regard to 
States. Thereafter, based on that information, the analysis continues by 
proving whether or not non-state actors are bound by these obligations. This 
part will therefore give an account for the applicable law and obligations in 
relation to States. The text will be divided into sections of obligations and 
after each obligation follows in which international legal instruments these 
obligations can be found. The obligations in customary international law 
will have its own section in the end of this chapter since it is of a special 
character from treaty law and thereby avoiding confusion. 
 
2.1 Brief History of the Legislation 
Regarding Child Soldiers 
When the Geneva Conventions were drafted, they did not include any 
provisions about child soldiers. The main inspiration to the conventions was 
the aftermaths of the Second World War. The only convention that dealt 
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with children in armed conflicts was the fourth Geneva Convention even 
though the issue of child soldiers was not mentioned.17  
 
Child soldiers by that time were not seen as a problem even though they had 
existed in the war. They were seen as voluntary, heroic or an unfortunate 
necessity. Therefore it was not seen as something that needed to be 
regulated in international law. The main focus was to keep the peace of the 
world and by preventing war, the concept of child soldiers was not likely to 
repeat itself in the future.18 Another aspect was that child soldiers were seen 
as an internal problem. It was not something for the international 
community to control. It was up to each State to regulate how they handled 
recruitment and protection of children in war times. These types of rights 
owned by individuals against the States were not a common phenomenon 
directly after the Second World War but it is something that has developed 
over time. The rights that were supposed to be regulated when the GCs were 
drafted were protection from actions of other States rather than the domestic 
State.19 
 
There is no definition of the term child in the GCs except from the age limit, 
which is set to fifteen years. This means that age fifteen marks the end of 
childhood according to the GCs. and not eighteen as it is in for example the 
Paris Principles and the CRC.20 
 
                                                
 
 
17 Happold, Matthew. Child Soldiers in International Law, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005, p. 54. 
18 Happold, Matthew, p. 55. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Happold, Matthew, p. 56; See section 2.2 of this thesis. 
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2.2 The Prohibition of Child Recruitment 
The prohibition of child recruitment is mentioned in several international 
instruments such as the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
I and II, The CRC and its Optional Protocol, the ILO Convention, The 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and customary 
international law.  
 
In article 51 of the fourth Geneva Convention, the prohibition of recruitment 
of protected persons is stated. Since children are part of the group of 
protected persons, the article refers to them as well although it is not aimed 
at protecting children specifically. Article 51 can also be seen as a 
prohibition against States to force inhabitants in occupied territory to fight 
against their own nation. Therefore it must be seen as a general rule, not 
only applicable to child soldiers.21 
 
In 1977 two additional protocols were adopted. They regulated the 
conditions for children in armed conflict more detailed than in the original 
GCs. The purposes of the protocols were to fill the gaps in the GCs but also 
to develop international humanitarian law.22 In AP I article 77.2 it says that 
the Parties shall refrain from recruiting children: 
‘…they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In 
recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but 
who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict 
shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.’ 
                                                
 
 
21 Commentary of 1958 to the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Available at: <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2C
777C1F24172394C12563CD0042C5AA>, accessed 9 November 2017. 
22 Happold, Matthew, p. 57. 
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In contrast to AP I, AP II regulates non-international conflicts of a certain 
level of intensity (according to article 1(1) AP II). It sets up minimum 
standards in internal conflicts. The provisions regarding the protection and 
the participation of children in non-international armed conflicts is regulated 
in the AP IIs 4th article. It sets up fundamental guarantees for protected 
groups affected by internal conflicts.23 The important paragraph relevant to 
the refrainment of child recruitment is article 4(3)(c): 
 
‘children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be 
recruited in the armed forces or groups…’ 
 
Since the AP II is regulating non-international conflicts, it does not only 
bind States which have ratified the protocol but also non-state subjects. This 
can be seen from the drafting history although it is not clear how these 
NSAs are bound by it. Even though this is not clear, it is generally accepted 
to interpret the AP II to be applicable to armed opposition groups.24  
 
The AP II is different from the AP I since it does not bind NSAs. There is 
one exception and that is when the people exercise their right to self-
determination in accordance with Articles 1(4) and 96(3) in AP I. This 
divide between the applications of AP I and II means that there is a gap in 
regard to the application to NSAs and their involvement in international 
conflicts which are common in modern warfare. When NSAs fight 
                                                
 
 
23 Commentary of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977. Available at: <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AA0C5BCBAB5C4A85C125
63CD002D6D09&action=openDocument>, accessed 9 November 2017.  
24 Happold, Matthew, p. 69. 
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alongside a State in an international conflict, there is a gap in international 
humanitarian law where the opposition group is under no obligation to not 
recruit children into their armed forces.25 Neither is there an obligation for 
the State if it lacks ‘effective’ or ‘overall’ control over the group’s actions as 
can be seen in the case Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez from ICTY.26 
 
Both of the protocols gained international acceptance slowly.27 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is a human rights convention and 
it was adopted in 1989. Compared to the two APs, the CRC was popular 
from the beginning and was ratified by many parties.28 Today, so many as 
196 States have ratified the Convention. This makes it the most ratified 
human rights treaty in history.29 The only State to this day, which has not 
ratified the Convention, is the United States.30   
 
At the time of the adoption of the convention, the problems concerning the 
involvement of children in military conflicts grew even bigger. War was, 
and still is, devastating for children affected by it. They are more exposed 
than others and especially in the poor countries. Children are often recruited 
                                                
 
 
25 Happold, Matthew, p. 70. 
26 Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic, Mario Cerkez (Trial Judgement), IT-95-14/2-T, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 26 February 2001, paras 
66 and 79. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,41483e9be.html>, [accessed 
7 November 2017].  
27 Happold, Matthew, p. 74. 
28 Ibid. 
29 FAQs and resources – Convention on the Rights of the Child – UNICEF. Available at: 
<https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30225.html>, accessed 8 November 2017. 
30 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner – Status of Ratification 
Interactive Dashboard. Available at: <http://indicators.ohchr.org>, accessed 8 November 
2017. 
  
 
20 
as agents and are unfortunately also among the innocent victims of war.31 
These problems were acknowledged in the CRC from 1989 and it 
established an obligation for all States to protect the children in war, which 
also includes an obligation to refrain from recruiting children into their 
armed forces. It establishes the minimum age for States to recruit children 
into their armed forces to eighteen.32  
 
The CRC has a definition of the term child in its very first article. It says 
that a child is a ‘human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under 
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’. In this case, 
national law is of subsidiary importance in the way that the CRC has 
precedence. In fact, Article 4 regulates the measures each State shall 
undertake including legislative, administrative and such measures for the 
implementation of the rights mentioned in the Convention.33  
 
Article 38(3) entails a prohibition against child recruitment:  
‘States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained 
the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those 
persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained 
the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to 
those who are oldest.’ 
 
Article 4.1 of the OP to the CRC is particularly relevant to NSAs. It 
provides the following:  
                                                
 
 
31 Ishay R. Micheline, p. 303. 
32 Ibid. 
33 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, Articles 1 and 4. Available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html>, accessed 8 November 2017.  
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1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, 
under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 
18 years. 
 
Article 4 is absolute in nature and the use of the term “armed groups” is 
relatively wide, not restrictive to only armed opposition groups but also 
other NSAs.34  
 
The ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour deals with 
the problem of child soldiers even though it is not comprehensively 
expressed in the Convention itself. Children in the ILO Convention are 
defined as all persons under eighteen35 and child soldiers are included in the 
definition of the frequently used term “worst forms of child labour” as 
stated in Article 3(a). In contrast to the CRC, the United States has ratified 
this convention.36 
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is a regional 
human rights treaty with focus on children’s rights. The Charter prohibits 
the recruitment of all children and it therefore goes even further than the 
                                                
 
 
34 Happold, Matthew, p. 79. 
35 ILO Convention, Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 (No. 182), Article 2. 
36 Ratifications of C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) – 
International Labour Organisation. Available at: 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_IN
STRUMENT_ID:312327:NO>, accessed 8 November 2017. 
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CRC, APs, OP and the ILO Convention 182.37 Today, the Charter has been 
ratified by 41 out of 54 States in the African Region.38 
 
2.3 Special Protection 
In the international instruments there are often a provision stating that 
children shall enjoy special protection of the Parties.  
 
For example, in AP I the protection of children is regulated in Article 77. 
The relevant paragraph is 77.1: 
 
1. Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected 
against any form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall provide 
them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or for 
any other reason. 
 
The CRC has a similar provision in Article 38(4): 
‘In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to 
protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all 
feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected 
by an armed conflict.’ 
 
Article 4.2 of the Optional Protocol to the CRC has a provision where the 
Parties to the Protocol shall take all feasible measures to make sure that the 
recruitment of children into armed forces is prevented. This provision is 
different from the direct recruitment of children by a State, instead it entails 
                                                
 
 
37 Happold, Matthew, p. 85. 
38 Ratification Table: The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child – African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Available at: 
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/child/ratification/>, accessed 8 November 2017. 
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a provision of preventing recruitment of children on the territory of the State 
and not only into their own armed forces:  
‘States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment 
and use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and 
criminalize such practices.’ 
 
2.4 The Protection from Taking Part in 
Hostilities 
Apart from providing provisions against child recruitment and the special 
protection of children, the legal instruments often include a provision which 
entails the protection of children from taking direct part in hostilities. 
 
This can be seen in AP I and the meaning of Article 77(2):  
‘The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that 
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct 
part in hostilities…’ 
 
Article 77(2) provides an obligation for the Parties to take all feasible 
measures to make sure that children do not take part in armed conflicts. This 
obligation is wider than refraining from child recruitment and it also applies 
to other organisations acting on the territory of the State even though they 
are not directly under the State´s control. In other words; the State has to 
take all feasible measures to ensure the protection of children in regard to 
NSAs acting on the State´s territory.39 
                                                
 
 
39 Commentary of 1987 Protection of Children to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Available at: <https://ihl-
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Article 4(3)(c), apart from providing a provision against child recruitment, 
states that children are not allowed to take part in hostilities. Article 4(3)(c) 
is similar to the regulation in article 77(2) of the AP I, but the restrictions in 
article 4(3)(c) are broader and applicable to internal conflicts. This is 
because the article imposes a different obligation on the State. The 
obligation in the AP II is of a more absolute nature since the focus lies more 
on the result of the measures instead of the means. Another reason why the 
scope is broader is that the AP II provides a larger scope concerning the 
participation of children in armed conflicts. In the AP I children are not 
allowed to take a ‘direct part’ in hostilities while they in the AP II they can 
not take part in any warlike acts.40  
 
The CRC has a provision in Article 38(2):  
‘States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in 
hostilities.’ 
 
Even though many States ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
there was also some dissatisfaction with the Article 38 of the convention. 
The dissatisfaction was primarily regarding the age limit in the second 
paragraph of the Article and the fact that it was set to fifteen instead of 
eighteen. This led to the proposal to include an additional protocol to the 
Convention. The Committee on the Rights of the Child initiated the 
proposal. The purpose of the committee was, and still is, to examine how 
                                                                                                                        
 
 
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=8E
174BC1926F72FAC12563CD00436C73>, accessed 9 November 2017.  
40 Happold, Matthew, p. 66. 
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the Parties to the CRC comply to the convention and the obligation it 
imposes on the contracting Parties.41 
 
The OP sets the same restrictions to the participation in hostilities as the AP 
I, meaning that children still can participate to some degree although not 
take a direct part in hostilities.42  Even though the age limit is raised to 
eighteen.43  
 
2.5 Obligations Crystallised in Customary 
International Law 
2.5.1 The Two Elements of Customary 
International Law 
As can be seen above in section 2.2 and onwards, there are several treaties 
that regulate the use of children in armed conflicts. There are different 
States that have ratified different treaties and this makes it difficult to 
interpret which obligations the different States are under. Since customary 
international law derives from practise and it is binding on all States 
whether or not they have participated in this practice, this is another way to 
find out which obligations the States are bound by.44 Customary rules exists 
                                                
 
 
41 Happold, Matthew, p. 74. 
42 Happold, Matthew, p. 77. 
43 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May 2000, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb180.html>, accessed 8 November 2017. 
44 Thirlway, Hugh. The Sources of International Law. In Evans, Malcolm (Ed.), 
International Law (4th edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 97.  
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if two elements are present: practice and opinio juris, which means opinion 
as to law or necessity.45  
 
2.5.2 Determining Which Rules Exist in 
Customary International Law 
Even if determining a customary international rule may be difficult, it has 
been concluded that there exists such a rule regarding the recruitment of 
children under fifteen into the armed forces of the States and also for States 
to take all feasible measures to prevent them from taking a direct part in 
hostilities.46 This has been established through State practice and is 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts.47 Although 
the minimum age for recruitment is not yet established through a uniform 
practice, it is agreed in the international community that the minimum age 
should not be below the age of fifteen.48 Even the rule to provide children 
with special protection during an armed conflict is crystallised in customary 
international law and is applicable to both international and non-
international conflicts.49 
 
                                                
 
 
45 Thirlway, Hugh, p. 98. 
46 Happold, Matthew, p. 91. 
47 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie & Doswald-Beck, Louise. Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 482. 
48 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie & Doswald-Beck, Louise, p. 485. 
49 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie & Doswald-Beck, Louise, p. 479. 
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2.5.3 The Status of International Legal 
Instruments  
Even though there are so many parties to the CRC, this convention does not 
convey customary international law in its entirety and neither is it an 
expression of opinio juris as stated in the Nicaragua Case. In this case the 
court discussed the principle of non-intervention and why it was part of 
international law by stating the following: ‘…statements whereby States 
avow their recognition of the principles of international law set forth in the 
United Nations Charter cannot strictly be interpreted as applying to the 
principle of non-intervention by States in the interna1 and external affairs of 
other States, since this principle is not, as such, spelt out in the Charter.’50  
 
The Nicaragua Case in turn refers to the Continental Shelf Case where the 
Court expressed itself in a similar way: ‘It is of course axiomatic that the 
material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the 
actual practice and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral 
conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining 
rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them.’51  
 
This means that we have to look elsewhere for the current customary 
international law by establishing practice and an opinio juris. Another 
problem arises when analysing the different treaties mentioned above. This 
problem is called ‘the Baxter paradox’ which means the problem with 
discerning whether the State’s true reason behind acting in a certain way 
                                                
 
 
50 Paramilitary Activities in and around Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA) (Merits), ICJ Rep. 
(1968) 14, p. 96.  
51 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriyu v. Malta), ICJ. Rep. (1985), para. 27. 
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was purely because an obligation created by the treaty or if it was because of 
real State practice.52 
 
As mentioned before in section 2.2 of this thesis, there is a gap between the 
different treaties since AP II only applies to non-international conflicts, the 
OP binds armed groups and the AP I and CRC only binds States that are 
Parties to these treaties. when talking about NSAs this proves to be a 
troublesome matter. Help must be found in the customary international law 
to cover this gap. 
 
The status of the APs as customary international law in regard to NSAs is 
important when the NSA operates on a territory of a State which is not a 
Party or has ratified the Protocol. There is evidence that points towards 
some of the articles of the AP II enjoy the status of customary international 
law and one part of this evidence is the discussion held by the ICTY in the 
Tadić appeal case.53 In this case the Tribunal stated: ‘Attention must also be 
drawn to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. Many 
provisions of this Protocol can now be regarded as declaratory of existing 
rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary law or else as 
having been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles.’54 
When analysing the statement of the Tribunal, it appears that it primarily 
refers to the norms overlapping with the ones in the common article 3 as 
customary international law. Which includes articles 4(2), 5, 6, and 13(2) 
                                                
 
 
52 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, ICTY, decision of 16 
November 1998, para 302. 
53 Zegveld, Liesbeth. The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International 
Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 20. 
54 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction), IT-94-1, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), 2 October 1995, para 117. 
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concerning the fundamental guarantees to persons to take no part in 
hostilities.55  
 
2.5.4 Applicability to States and Non-State 
Actors 
Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have, when 
mentioning child soldiers, avoided expressing themselves in a way where 
they only mention obligations of States. Instead they have preferred using 
terms such as “all parties” and not “all States”. This points toward an 
interpretation of the UN wanting to include NSAs as being part of the same 
obligation as States.56  
 
The Secretary-General compiled a list by a request from the SC. This list 
was supposed to consist of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use 
children in violation of relevant international obligations.57 The list was 
summited as an annex to a report made by the Secretary-General on children 
and armed conflict. This list included not only States but also NSAs.58  
 
Following this list made by the Secretary-General, the Security Council 
issued another resolution: ‘…calls on the parties identified in this list to 
provide information on steps they have taken to halt their recruitment or use 
                                                
 
 
55 Zegveld, Liesbeth, p. 21. 
56 Happold, Matthew, p. 95. 
57 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1379 (2001) [on the protection of 
children in armed conflicts], 20 November 2001, S/RES/1379 (2001), para 16. Available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c4e94561c.html>, accessed 29 November 2017. 
58 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2002/1299 
(26 November 2002) (third report), annex. 
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of children in armed conflict in violation of the international 
obligations…’59 Since the list included names of NSAs as well as States, the 
Security Council must have agreed with the Secretary-General’s conclusion 
that all parties to the conflict, including the NSAs, acted in violation of their 
international obligations. This means, according to this conclusion, that 
NSAs have obligations under international law even if they are not parties to 
treaties and these obligations are customary in nature.60 These customary 
rules are newly emerged in international law and there is not yet a lot of 
evidence to indicate the existence of these customary rules.61 
 
 
                                                
 
 
59 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1460 (2003) [on children in armed 
conflict], 30 January 2003, S/RES/1460 (2003), para 5. Available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f45dbdd0.html>, accessed 29 November 2017. 
60 Happold, Matthew, p. 96. 
61 Happold, Matthew, p. 99. 
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3 The Origin of the Obligations 
of NSAs Derivated from 
Treaties Ratified by States 
Even though it is not settled in the international community how, or even if, 
non-state actors are bound by international law, there are two aspects to this 
problem that have appeared during the construction of this essay. The first is 
the actual applicability problem, meaning how the non-state actors are 
bound by the law expressively applicable to State actors. In order to discuss 
this problem, the second aspect to the problem appears. This is the problem 
of the different criteria that have to be fulfilled by the NSAs in order for 
them to be considered as a subject governed by international law. These are 
criteria based on the characteristics of the NSA and they make the NSAs 
more advanced and make them share characteristics of a State.  
 
In this part of the thesis these criteria will be discussed. Note that this list is 
not exhaustive in any way but it discusses in a broad way the different 
aspects represented in most of the doctrine and articles written by legal 
scholars today. The purpose of presenting the characteristics below is to 
better analysing if NSAs are bound by the obligations reported in the second 
part of this thesis.  
 
Several legal documents, such as Common Article 3 in the GCs, have 
handled the issue and came to the conclusion that armed groups, even NSAs 
shall comply with international humanitarian law. The Security Council and 
other institutions have in turn referred to these documents. The Common 
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Article 3 states that the obligations mentioned refers to not only States, but 
also all parties to a non-international armed conflict. 62 In the resolution 
1564 the SC concluded that all armed groups, including NSAs in a conflict 
in Darfur were to make sure that their members complied with international 
humanitarian law.63 
 
The problem has been handled by scholars and is not settled in any way. 
Even though the issue has not been settled, it does not mean that it has not 
been discussed in advanced settings. On the contrary, the Appeals Chamber 
of the Sierra Leone Special Court has brought up the topic in 2004 where 
the Court stated that all parties to an armed conflict are bound by 
international humanitarian law and in the case of NSAs being part of an 
armed conflict, they are also bound by international humanitarian law even 
though only States can be an official Party to a treaty.64  
 
Also the Institut de Droit International shared this view in a resolution from 
1999. They stated that all parties to an international conflict had an 
obligation to comply with international humanitarian law. But they also 
concluded that the obligation included fundamental human rights as well.65 
                                                
 
 
62 Dinstein, Yoram. Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, Oxford: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 63. 
63 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) [on Darfur, Sudan], 18 
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The different sources and their conclusions have given way to intense 
discussion among the international community and gained the attention of 
scholars. The fact that institutions of high esteem commented on a subject in 
international law without mentioning where the obligation of NSAs 
originated from amounted to much controversy among scholars.66  
 
How the international community came to this conclusion might originate 
from either one or several different theories. These theories are part of the 
first aspect of the problem of how NSAs are bound by international law and 
will be mentioned briefly since this part of the essay will mainly focus on 
the second aspect.67   
 
The first theory is whether or not it is possible to bind a third party through 
a treaty. The second theory is since international treaties and legal 
instruments bind States, they affect the national law by binding the States’ 
subject and thereby any armed group including its members acting on its 
territory by legislative jurisdiction. The third theory applies to NSAs that 
aspire to become governments or claiming to be self governed. By their 
aspiration or claim, they regard themselves as being a State even though 
they might not be internationally recognised as such, it can be said that they 
are subjecting themselves to being bound by the same treaties as recognised 
States would be. The next theory is if it is possible for a non-state actor to 
                                                                                                                        
 
 
Non-State Entities are Parties”, Session of Berlin – 1999, para II. Available at: 
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66 Dinstein, Yoram, p. 64. 
67 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors. In Clapham, Andrew & Gaeta, 
Paola (Eds.), Haeck, Tom & Priddy, Alice (Ass. Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of 
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agree to be bound by a specific treaty and thereby be bound by the 
obligations it imposes on the Parties to the treaty. Another theory is the 
existence of international legal instruments which are directly addressed to 
non-state actors. Finally but not exclusively there is the possibility of the 
existence of customary international law which directly binds NSAs.68 All 
of these theories will be presented below. 
 
3.1 The Issue of Binding a Third Party 
The question of the origin of the obligations of NSAs is a difficult one. This 
is since they are not subjects in international law in the same way as States. 
They are therefore not able or allowed to ratify or accede to any treaty and 
cannot be Party to them. When trying to interpret the subjects of the treaties 
and the overall will of the Parties to them, the States have often intended 
them to also apply to NSAs.69  
 
The main principle to keep in mind here is that you cannot impose 
obligations on a third party through a treaty. This is not an absolute rule 
since it is nowadays generally accepted that treaties may have effects on 
other than the Parties to the treaty. This principle derives from principles in 
contract law and is associated with a Latin maxim: pacta tertiis nec nocent 
nec prosunt.70 If this rule is violated by this would be a breach of the rule of 
sovereign equality in regard to a sovereign State.71 The problem can be best 
illustrated in international law by article 11 in the VCLT. The GCs and the 
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APs expressively admit to only allowing States to become “High 
Contracting Parties”.72 Article 11 of the VCLT prescribes that in order for a 
State to be bound by a treaty, it has to consent to it by becoming a 
contracting Party to it.73 This means that a non-state actor, even though it 
sometimes may be seen as a State, can nonetheless not become a Party to a 
treaty and by default not be bound by it according to the Vienna 
Convention. As an actor in international law, the NSA is unauthorized to 
participate in the construction of treaties or be a Party to them. The question 
that follows is if a non-state actor that is not able to be a party to a treaty 
still can become bound by one.74  
 
Article 34 of the VCLT is also addressing the issue of binding a third party 
in saying that a treaty does not create neither obligations nor rights for a 
third State without its consent.75 It is unclear how this provision affects a 
third party that can not be seen as a State but it seems as though Article 34 
provides an exception to the rule if the parties have intended the provision to 
be binding on third States or international organizations. These third parties 
must in that case agree to the provision in writing in order to become bound 
by it.76 Even if it would be possible for a non-state actor to enter into 
agreements with States, this would not be seen as an agreement that creates 
obligations under international law because it is not concluded between 
States.77 
                                                
 
 
72 Zegveld, Liesbeth, p. 14. 
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Despite the issue of not being able to bind a third party, it has for some time 
been generally accepted that treaties between States may have effects on 
other parties than themselves.78 Common Article 3 is one example of a 
treaty that is binding on NSAs for several reasons. Article three is directly 
addressed to any party to the conflict and it applies to non-international 
conflicts as well as international. It is also crystallised as a rule in customary 
international law. Clapham concludes that combining these reasons means 
that Common Article 3 is binding on NSAs whether or not they have made a 
written consent to the provisions. The fact that the Sierra Leone Special 
Court, the UK Ministry of Defence and the ICJ have applied Article 3 as 
binding towards NSAs supports this theory. Even though this Article can be 
seen as binding, this can not be said for all norms found in treaties 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts. It is important to remember 
the uniqueness of Common Article 3 regarding its standing in international 
law.79 
 
Clapham agrees with the fact that it is misleading to strictly apply the 
doctrine that treaties only bind those who are Parties to them. He explains 
that the doctrine has evolved and that it is possible today to say that treaties 
can create obligations for others except the Parties or even States. It may 
still be limits to the nature of these obligations due to the State’s jurisdiction 
but this is resolved if the active personality and territorial jurisdiction are 
combined.80  
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The ambiguity of intending to bind a third party through a treaty while 
treaty law dictates that this it is forbidden is apparent although it is possible 
to see some development lately. This problem leads to scholars and others 
discussing this problem to solve it through some other way by looking at 
other sources or theories of where the binding nature might originate from. 
This focus often shifts to customary international law since this is a problem 
concerning treaty law.81    
 
3.2 Legislative Jurisdiction 
The first theory presented is the theory of legislative jurisdiction. Since 
NSAs can not become parties to a treaty themselves, they are indirectly 
bound by them through the States that have ratified them and become 
Parties to treaties. In this way, the NSAs are not required to ratify any treaty. 
If they operate on a States’ territory that is Party to a treaty, they are bound 
by the States’ rights and obligations which in turn derive from the treaty to 
which the State is a Party to. The moment when a State ratifies a treaty, the 
NSAs operating on its territory are automatically bound by the obligations 
set forth by the norms stated in the treaty.82 This alternative is met by 
several objections, in particular the problem with the NSAs defiance of the 
domestic legal regime. Non-state actors are often protesting against the State 
and the established order. This makes it troublesome if the legislative 
jurisdiction was the one thing binding NSAs to international treaties because 
it would be hard for them to respect to be bound by obligations on this 
ground.83 
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The legislative jurisdiction theory, or doctrine, is based on the ability of the 
State to legislate for all of its people and this legislation can originate from 
either international or national law. This principle applies even if some 
nationals decide to fight the regime. It works the same way when a State 
legislates in accordance with new international law which affects the  rights 
and obligations. of the nationals. This theory works on the assumption that 
States can transform its own binding legal obligation as binding legal 
obligations for its nationals and the same goes for any NSA that works in 
the State’s territory. Although this assumption would be logical, it is 
problematic to draw such a conclusion based solely on the ratification to a 
treaty by the State. Moreover, this theory requires a nationality link which 
sometimes might be hard to establish when it comes to NSAs because they 
are protesting against the current regime and will often not acknowledge 
their nationality. This would also mean that in case any foreign fighters 
participate in the name of the NSA, they are not as bound by national law as 
some of the other fighters. Since NSAs often are multi- and transnational, 
such a principle would prove difficult.84  
 
The problem of the nationality of the NSAs or its members would seize to 
exist if it would be possible to bind a third party to the obligations in a treaty 
as explained in the previous paragraph. When it comes to individual 
responsibility, this has happened in the field of international criminal law 
without much objection. It is however more complicated in international 
humanitarian law and human rights law as will be discussed in more detail 
in section 4.1 of this thesis.85   
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3.3 Governmental Claims  
Another theory in regard to how NSAs are bound by laws basically created 
by another party is if the NSA is regarded as its own entity, separate from 
the State. They are then bound by the obligations in international law 
irrespective of the State on which territory they operate as an own 
authoritarian entity. This theory distinguishes itself from the theory of 
legislative jurisdiction by allowing the NSA to be able to be a bearer of its 
own obligations directly. They are, through this theory, regarded as 
independent entities in relation to the State. In order for this theory to be 
applicable, the NSA has to exercise de facto authority over either persons or 
territory. Otherwise the NSA is not regarded as an individual entity and the 
theory is thereby not applicable. The authority and the degree of authority 
required to meet the conditions is discussed in chapter 4.2 in this thesis. The 
theory lacks an explanation for the origin of the obligations of NSAs, that 
do not meet the requirement of authority even though the Common Article 3 
still, expressively, binds them.86 
 
3.4 Acceptance 
As has been discussed in Chapter 3.1 about binding a third party, Article 35 
of the VCLT opens up the opportunity for a third party to be bound by a 
treaty if that party has given its consent in writing. The fact that the rules 
have effect on States however, does not guarantee that they have any effect 
                                                
 
 
86 Zegveld, Liesbeth, p. 15. 
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on other parties.87  Therefore it is likely that these rules do not apply to 
NSAs and can therefore not explain how NSAs may be bound by rules 
applicable to non-international armed conflict. However, a treaty can create 
both rights and obligations for individuals, not only for the States that have 
ratified it. That combined with that there is, at least, one example of a treaty 
that effectively binds a third party. Namely the UN Charter. UN bodies such 
as the Security Council can create binding resolutions on NSAs and other 
non-members. These facts can support the argument that NSAs can be 
bound by treaty law as a third party and therefore be affected by the 
provision in the VCLT.88 Two criteria have to be met; the contracting 
Parties of the specific treaty must be willing for it to be applicable to the 
third party and the third party must accept in writing.89 By arguing this way, 
it may be possible for NSAs to consent to being bound by certain rules in 
international law. 
 
3.5 Customary International Law 
All of the above mentioned theories have been based on treaty law. There is 
however another alternative that is based on customary international law 
instead. When discussing the origin of the obligations of NSAs in regard to 
customary international law, the issue is similar to the theory of legislative 
jurisdiction and if the NSA is regarded as its own entity. Some help can be 
given from Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ which defines 
international custom ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’.  
                                                
 
 
87 Pushparajah, Nadarajah. How are Armed Non-State Actors Bound to Apply the Law of 
Non-International Armed Conflict, 12 ISIL Y.B. Int'l Human. & Refugee L. 86-131 (2012-
2013), p. 102.   
88 Pushparajah, Nadarajah, p. 103. 
89 Pushparajah, Nadarajah, p. 104. 
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Compared to international treaties, customary international law is 
considered as binding on NSAs. This is why it has become so important to 
determine which rules in treaty law are also conveyed in customary 
international law. Customary international law can be applied to States, 
armed opposition groups, non-state actors as well as individuals.90  
 
When it is not mentioned where the practice shall originate from, this could 
be interpreted as if not only State practice is applicable. There is no 
evidence of the Court applying other than State practice when discussing 
customary international law but it seems that this is possible.91 The ICTY on 
the other hand has used practice of NSAs in its judgements of the Tadić 
appeal case. The Tribunal stated as follows: ‘In addition to the behaviour of 
belligerent States, Governments and insurgents, other factors have been 
instrumental in bringing about the formation of the customary rules at 
issue’.92 The context of the issue discussed by the Tribunal was which 
customary norms applicable in a non-international conflict in Salvador 
where the NSA called The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) was involved. In order to solve the issue, the Tribunal looked at the 
practice formed by the FMLN which is proof of the possibility that practice 
from NSAs are relevant in the discussion of their obligations under 
customary international law.93 In general, it must be seen as an exception to 
                                                
 
 
90 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, p. 779. 
91 Zegveld, Liesbeth, p. 26. 
92 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction), IT-94-1, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), para 108, 2 October 1995. Available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,47fdfb520.html>, accessed 23 November 2017. 
93 Zegveld, Liesbeth, p. 26. 
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include the practise of NSAs into the general practice that forms customary 
international law.94 
 
Customary international law may seem to imply the same problem as treaty 
law in regard to how it is binding upon non-state actors. The difference 
between treaty law and customary international law in this case is that the 
latter binds States even without their consent as well as it imposes 
obligations on all individuals and groups wherever they may be operating in 
the world. NSAs are not excepted from this rule.95  
 
Since NSAs can not be said to contribute to the development of rules of 
customary international law, the issue is much the same as the problem with 
the two previous theories of treaty law. Namely how NSAs can be bound by 
law that they are not participating to creating. One argument to why this 
theory is accurate despite from the concern of NSAs not participating in the 
creation of the law, is to see them as no different from individuals bound by 
international custom even though they have not contributed to the formation 
of it. The main argument being that all individuals are bound by 
international law without having been part of its creation, so why should 
NSAs be differentiated from them?96  
                                                
 
 
94 Dinstein, Yoram, p. 72. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Dinstein, Yoram, p. 73. 
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4 Threshold Requirements for 
Non-State Actors  
Having established that NSAs can in fact be bound by international law 
through different theories in the previous section, the next question to be 
answered will be when NSAs will be bound by international law. Therefore, 
in this section of the thesis, conditions determining whether obligations 
previously identified apply to non-state actors will be presented. These 
conditions are relevant to whether or not the obligations presented in the 
second section of this thesis are applicable to non-state actors as well as 
States. The list is in no way exhaustive and it is first and foremost not 
determined if these conditions are required in order for international law to 
be binding on NSAs. When reading material discussing this issue, these are 
the most frequently occurring conditions mentioned by scholars and the 
conditions in this thesis are simply a compilation of those.  
 
Having acknowledged the different possibilities of how NSAs are bound by 
obligations in international law, it is time to move on to presenting the 
different characteristics NSAs need to have in order to be bound by 
international law. These characteristics together with the different theories 
above make it possible to analyse the possibility of how NSAs are bound by 
international law.    
 
There are mainly three characteristics mentioned by for example the Darfur 
Commission. These characteristics are best seen as a form of threshold in 
order for a NSA to be bound by customary international law. The Darfur 
Commission mentions thresholds of organization, stability and effective 
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control of territory and the possession of international legal personality.97 
When these characteristics are determined, the next step is to determine 
which rules are applicable and if they mirror customary international law.98 
This means, a part from a violence criterion to the specific non-international 
conflict, the NSA has to fulfil a set of requirements in order for international 
humanitarian law to be applicable. While the violence criterion will not be 
discussed in this thesis, this section will summarize some of the criteria 
common for both international humanitarian law and human rights law.99 
 
4.1 The Applicability of IHL Versus HR 
Law 
Some observations on human rights law have to be made in order to 
understand the specific issues connected to this branch of international law. 
The distinction between IHL and HR law is important when dealing with 
the applicability issue because of how these two branches of international 
law differ in character. It is far more well-established that IHL is applicable 
to NSAs even though it is still a question to how this is and where the 
obligations originate from. While HR law is a bigger issue mainly because it 
is seen as a branch of international law strictly applicable to States and the 
rights are held by the individuals against it. Therefore NSAs are not as often 
directly addressed in HR treaties. Since HR law is considered applicable 
only to States, it would be problematic to acknowledge NSAs as bound by 
                                                
 
 
97 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary General, 25 January 2005, para 172. Available at: 
<http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf>, accessed 10 December 2017. 
98 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, p. 780. 
99 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, p. 786. 
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HR law since that would recognise them in the legal society as a group 
similar to States and this is not something the international community is 
likely to do.100  
 
It is well established that Human Rights Law applies in armed conflicts as 
well as in any other times. This means that the threshold of violence 
mentioned in the section 4.2.1 below is not needed in order to establish if 
NSAs are bound by it. This is since IHL and Human Rights Law works 
complementary, side-by-side.101   
 
Clapham sees the notion of Human Rights being addressed only to States as 
a myth. He is of the belief that nowadays, international human rights law is 
evolving and it is increasingly considered as being applicable to NSAs. This 
is partly because the actions of the UN and different human rights report 
regarding eventual human rights violations by NSAs.102 The fact that 
instruments can be directed to States only by using terms such as “States 
Parties to the convention” does not mean that they do not also apply to 
NSAs.103  
 
While international humanitarian law sets out demanding criteria in order 
for the NSAs to be bound by the law, human rights law is evolving in this 
area because the terminology in different treaties in regard to NSAs are 
getting more loose. In for example, the OP to the CRC and the Africa Union 
Convention, there is no mention of that the NSA has to be organized in a 
                                                
 
 
100 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, p. 787. 
101 Bellal, Annyssa & Casey-Maslen, Stuart. Enhancing Compliance with International Law 
by Armed Non-State Actors, 3 Goettingen J. Int'l L, 175-198 (2011), p. 185. 
102 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, p. 789. 
103 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, p. 790. 
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specific way or engaged in a certain level of violence. The legitimacy issue 
of acknowledging NSAs as State-entities is solved by stating that the 
applicability of the treaty in no way changes the international personality of 
the NSA.104  
 
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has in multiple reports, 
which only focus on NSAs, mentioned child recruitment as a human rights 
violation.105 The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions made a similar observation in regard to the civil war in 
Sri Lanka. He stated that the NSA called LTTE and the government must 
both respect the human rights. While the government had binding legal 
obligations and the NSA did not, it still was a member of the international 
community and was according to the Special Rapporteur therefore bound by 
these obligations.106 
 
It has also been argued recently by the International Law Association that 
NSAs, even though they do not reach any of the conditions or characteristics 
in the next section, are still bound by norms that enjoy jus cogens status.107  
 
                                                
 
 
104 Clapham, Andrew. Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, p. 792. 
105 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Mali, 7 January 2013, A/HRC/22/33. UN 
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107 International Law Association (ILA), Non State Actors, First Report of the Committee, 
Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and scope of project and Legal 
issues, The Hague Conference 2010, para. 3.2. 
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4.2 Different Characteristics of NSAs 
4.2.1 Threshold of Organisation 
The ICTY is one institution that has dealt with the different thresholds 
necessary for international law to be applicable to NSAs. The ICTY has 
established that there are some indicative factors that would point towards 
the organisation reaching the requirement of the threshold of organisation. 
Even though the factors are by themselves not enough, together they are 
strong indications of an established organisation.108  
 
‘Such indicative factors include the existence of a command structure and 
disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group; the existence of a 
headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of 
the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and 
military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military 
operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a 
unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with 
one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace 
accords.’ 
 
This condition is only applicable in regard to IHL and not human 
rights law since it is applicable at all times and a threshold of violence 
is therefore not necessary to establish if NSAs are bound by human 
rights provisions.109 
 
                                                
 
 
108 Bellal, Annyssa & Casey-Maslen, Stuart, p. 183. 
109 Bellal, Annyssa & Casey-Maslen, Stuart, p. 185. 
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4.2.1.1 Sufficiently Developed Structure 
The ICC Trial Chamber has mentioned the need of an armed group to have a 
sufficiently degree of organisation, in the case Lubanga110. This is in order for them 
to be able to carry out acts of violation. The requirement should, according to the 
Trial Chamber, be limited and applied with a degree of flexibility. Factors that 
should be included when determining if the group has a sufficient degree of 
organisation are: internal hierarchy, command structure and rules, available military 
equipment, the ability to plan and execute military operations and the extent, 
seriousness and intensity of its military involvement in the conflict.111  
 
4.2.1.2 Elements of Governmental Functions 
 
It has also been discussed whether elements of governmental functions have 
to be present. This would include factors as, for example, authority over the 
population in the territory in which they have control.112 
 
NSAs can have governmental functions of different degree. One approach is that if 
the NSA has de facto governmental functions, they are bound by international law. 
They are bound through the element of statehood this fact provides, recognition of 
governments and State responsibility. This means that the approach shifts from 
individuality to the entire organisation behind the NSA. This argument is based on 
the governmental functions within the NSA, how they are exercised and the 
                                                
 
 
110 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , ICC-01/04-01/06, International Criminal Court 
(ICC), 14 March 2012. 
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aspiration of the NSA to become an independent State.113  
 
Although this theory is not disconnected from the obligations of the State on which 
territory the NSA operates on. The obligations the NSA is bound by are dependent 
on which obligations in international law apply to the State. Therefore, this theory 
has the same problem as the one with legislative jurisdiction in the sense that it 
focuses on the State on which the NSA does not approve of.114   
 
There are however differences from the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction. The first 
is that the application of the law originates from the NSA itself and its 
characteristics instead from the State. This would make the question of the 
legitimacy of the State, from the NSAs point of view irrelevant. Another difference 
is that while legislative jurisdiction focuses on whether or not the State has ratified 
any treaties in the past, the argument of governmental functions focuses on the 
factual circumstances in the present. It also focuses on the future since it is 
dependent on future aspirations of the NSA to become a State. Overall, it focuses on 
the NSA as an individual which would make them more inclined to recognise their 
obligations in international law.115 
 
This argument is not without issues. Not all NSAs aspire to become a new 
State or reach the threshold required of de facto governmental functions.116 
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4.2.2 Stability and Effective Control 
Additional Protocol II lays down even more conditions in order for it to be 
applicable to NSAs. One of them is that the NSA has to have effective 
control of a territory within the State where the non-international conflict 
takes place. This condition is stated in Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Protocol. 
While the condition of effective control is hard to establish since the 
provision does not state what kind of degree the control must be. One 
interpretation would be that the NSA must have similar control as the one a 
State has of its territory.117 Another interpretation made by the ICRC is that 
the control could be partial.118  
 
Another argument is that the NSA must have de facto territorial control and claim it 
as their own. When the NSA claims control they both directly and indirectly 
represent the people in that region and thereby acts as a form of a non-recognised 
State. The argument against this theory is that even though a NSA has territorial 
control, this does not automatically mean that it represents the State. Another aspect 
is how long this territorial control must be in effect. How long do they have to be in 
control of the territory before they are bound by certain obligations in international 
law?119  
 
It is generally accepted in international law that if a NSA becomes a State, they are 
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still responsible for their actions they made as a NSA.120 However, not all NSAs that 
have territorial control become new States. As Clapham says:  
Rather than focusing on the theoretical possibility of holding a state 
accountable for the acts of the insurgent group that went on to become the 
state-it is time to look at another way in which to say that the group 
themselves are the bearer of international obligations.121 
 
4.2.3 International Legal Personality 
International Legal Personality is something commonly discussed by 
scholars in regard to NSAs. If they are considered to have the same 
personality as States, this could answer to why treaties are binding on both 
States and NSAs alike. This condition will further be examined and also its 
correlation with the application of Common Article 3. 
 
Armed groups such as NSAs, no matter how organised they are, are in no 
capacity to have legal personality. Even though it can be argued that it is 
possible for NSAs to have legal personality although limited and that this 
limited personality originates from Common Article 3 and other similar 
legal instruments which mention NSAs as parties to international conflicts 
                                                
 
 
120 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Article on Responsibility of States for  
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and therefore have obligations under international law.122 This thesis 
however has no support in the overall practice of States.123  
 
In order to come to a satisfying conclusion on whether or not NSAs have 
some kind of legal personality, it is important to look at the legal documents 
and not only the argument put forth. In this case, Common Article 3 
provides good guidance. The very last provision of Article 3 says: “The 
application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflict.” This provision was first added to ease the minds of 
the States. If it were not for this restriction, it would be hard for 
governments to supress a revolt or civil war because it would interfere with 
the Government’s authority. In effect, when dealing with NSAs and 
applying Common Article 3, the State is not granting the NSA any 
authority. This applies the other way around as well; if a NSA would apply 
the Article, it would not give it international status. No matter whatever title 
or claim they have.124  
 
The Appeals Chamber of the SCSL said in the Kallon case that there is no 
doubt that Common Article 3 is binding on States and NSAs but this does 
not by itself mean that NSAs have international personality under 
international law.125 
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5 Analysis 
The main hypothesis to be proven in this thesis is that even though there are 
some uncertainties among the scholars in the legal international society, 
non-state actors do have obligations under international law similar to those 
that States are bound by.    
 
It has proven difficult to find out exactly which obligations regarding child 
soldiers NSAs are bound by in any given situations. However there are 
some tools that can prove useful in order to determine which obligations 
apply in which situations.  
 
Since the field of regulations regarding child soldiers are divided into three 
sections: international humanitarian law, human rights law and customary 
international law this complicates the determination of applicable 
obligations even further. As can be seen from this thesis, human rights law 
and international humanitarian law are applied differently in regard to 
NSAs. This is since human rights law is more focused on rights owned by 
an individual against a State. In other words; human rights law is more 
State-centric. From the point of view of the NSA, this proves problematic. 
Hopefully, since child soldiers are often an issue in times of war, where 
international humanitarian law applies, it does not matter too much that 
NSAs may not be bound by human rights law in the same way because 
other obligations derived from IHL are applicable in those situations 
instead.  
 
The prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers, the protection of 
children in armed conflicts in general and the protection of children from 
taking part in hostilities are mentioned in both human rights and 
international humanitarian law treaties. Some of those regulations are even 
seen as customary international law. Especially common article 3 of the 
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Geneva Conventions, some parts of the AP II and the recruitment of 
children. Which means that there are provisions that apply to non-
international armed conflicts and possibly could apply to NSAs and not only 
States.  
 
What can be said about the regulation of children is that there are extensive 
international instruments that regulate their protection in armed conflict in 
several ways. The CRC and the Geneva Conventions have many 
ratifications made by many States even though the CRC may not be 
considered as customary international law.  
 
While a lot of these instrument presented in this essay are directed to and 
bind States, there is a question of whether they also bind NSAs and how. 
Since human rights instruments are directed to States in a more prominent 
way than international human right treaties, it is possible that they do not 
apply to NSAs at all even though it seems like the development is headed 
towards a different path lately. Therefore there is no real evidence or 
certainty that for example the Convention on the Rights of the Child or its 
Optional Protocol bind non-state actors at this point in time. On the other 
hand, the development towards it being applicable to non-state actors has 
been seemingly fast and it may be so in a near future. 
 
For the moment international humanitarian law and customary international 
law must be the focus when establishing whether NSAs are bound by 
regulations regarding children and child recruitment. The three different 
obligations regarding children in armed conflict seem to exist in both treaty 
law and customary international law. Having established the existence of 
these obligations, the next task would be to analyse whether or not non-state 
actors are bound by them. 
 
When looking at the GCs and its APs, it seems as though the AP II is 
especially relevant because it refers to non-international conflicts. The AP I, 
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is not as relevant and does not, according to Matthew Happold, bind NSAs 
except from when the people exercise their right to self-determination.  
 
After having determined that there are obligations that could possibly be 
applicable to NSAs, the questions that follow are if and how NSAs, as a 
party to an armed conflict, are bound by international law. If they indeed 
have obligations where do they originate from and why? There are a few 
theories to answer those questions; legislative jurisdiction, they themselves 
aspire to become or claim to be governments and through customary 
international law.  
 
Even if one or several of the theories give a satisfying answer to the 
problem, this thesis proves that the NSA itself still has to reach certain 
requirements in order to be bound by obligations regarding child soldiers.  
 
In order for them to be bound by the obligation to not recruit children into 
their armed forces, there has to exist an obligation applicable in international 
law (preferably international humanitarian law or customary international 
law), the obligation must originate from somewhere and the non-state actor 
has to live up to a set of requirements.  
 
This is where it becomes really interesting. Each of these theories have 
flaws and it is in no way obvious when either one of them apply. The first 
two theories are based on treaty law and the third is based on customary 
international law. Customary international law seems to be the easiest to 
determine, if it can be established that there exists an obligation in 
customary international law, NSAs are probably bound by it since it is 
generally considered as being binding on NSAs.  
 
In order to reach a satisfying conclusion it is important to examine the 
specific conflict, the NSA and its characteristics, the obligation and where it 
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is found and also the children since some instruments refer to child soldiers 
as persons under fifteen and others as under eighteen.  
 
Either way, the legal position in regard to NSAs and their obligations in 
international law whether it is regarding child soldiers or any other 
provision has to be clarified. The international community and the legal 
setting are unclear and the practice is incoherent when it comes to applicable 
law to non-state actors.  
 
This thesis has not brought up the issue of compliance except when it comes 
to where the obligations originate from and whether or not NSAs are bound 
by them and only in brief by mentioning that some NSAs oppose the regime 
and are therefore unlikely to accept to be bound by an obligation through the 
State. This thesis has sought to answer different questions but even though 
the NSA is bound by an obligation through other means but the State of 
which they are opposing, it is unlikely that they would comply by it. The 
most important thing to establish in this essay is the obligations, why and 
how NSAs are bound by them. The issue of NSAs not complying with their 
obligations is a matter for another thesis but still worth mentioning.  
 
When analysing the regulations found in the different international legal 
documents in regard to the protection of children, they seem to be clear, 
elaborate and definitive. In that sense, they are satisfying. However, the 
application of them is not clear when it comes to the NSAs. There are 
several instances in different conflicts around the world where not only 
States have recruited children in armed conflict. In order to solve the 
problem of children being affected by war, all aspects of the law have to be 
more defined. There should be no confusion of the law itself, the application 
of it or who are bound by it.  
 
By determining that non-state actors are in fact bound by the international 
legal obligations regarding child soldiers and thereby clarifying the 
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international law, it is hopefully easier to bring forward a change to how 
children are treated in armed conflicts around the world. In internal armed 
conflicts, it seems as though non-state actors should be held to the same 
standards as States and also be bound by the obligations regarding the 
protection of children. Since it is not only States but also other actors in 
wars that use child soldiers, these obligations should apply to them all in 
order to reach the intended impact. By determining the frames and the 
applicability of international law, not only States will be accountable for 
recruiting child soldiers but non-state actors will also have the obligation to 
refrain from exposing and using children in armed conflicts. 
  
 
58 
6 Conclusion 
If the obligations to protect and refrain from recruiting children are 
mentioned in customary international law this means that NSAs are 
probably bound by them, at least if the NSAs have the characteristics 
mentioned. The prohibition against child recruitment is mentioned in lists of 
customary international law and NSAs are thereby bound by the obligation 
not to recruit children into their armed forces.  
 
Human rights law is generally not binding on NSAs in non-international 
conflicts but some international humanitarian law obligations are if the non-
state actor reaches one or several of the mentioned requirements. They are 
either bound by the obligation through legislative jurisdiction, governmental 
claims or customary international law. 
 
Despite the different legal instruments in force today, they still do not 
provide enough protection for children in armed conflicts. Some of these 
problems lies in the issue of binding non-state actors to obligations in 
international law. While millions of children die every decade, it is of 
paramount importance to clarify the law and stop the non-state actors from 
escaping justice.  
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